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INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to explore the academic and other literature associated with the development and practices of international rating agencies and to develop a framework to understand the various rating agency methodologies.
These objectives are achieved in the paper via three sections. Section one generally provides an introduction into international rating agencies and their historical development. From this, it is determined that the majority of international rating agencies are concerned with the financial markets, especially credit ratings. Also it is established that international rating agencies can affect behaviour in various ways including performance disclosure, changing general strategies and financial strategies.
In section two, the academic literature relating to this topic is examined across five main areas: (1) the types of rating products; (2) identifying possible changes in company behaviour, especially disclosure, because of international rating agencies; (3) the motivations for companies to increase disclosure; (4) the independence of rating agencies; and (5) the independence of auditors in their role of issuing an opinion on company disclosures.
Section three examines the issues associated with independence for a rating agency and the acceptability of their ratings by using the auditor independence framework.
The three rating methodologies (solicited, unsolicited and co-operative) are also analysed to determine the acceptability of each method. This is done by examining the following: (1) the extent to which the rating agency is able to maintain independence;
(2) avoid conflict of interests; and (3) obtain reliable information to make an informed rating opinion. It finds that the co-operative rating is the most acceptable rating methodology.
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RATING AGENCIES
In the 1990s, the importance of international rating agencies became more pronounced among investors, creditors, regulators and other stakeholders who were interested in screening companies based on specific financial criteria. In this period, rating agencies experienced growth and developed new ratings products (Cantor & Packer, 1996) .
Worldwide, there are numerous rating agencies providing financial ratings, however, the rating industry counts only two major world players both originating in the United States: Moody's Investor Services; and Standard & Poor's (S&P). They have become global following the dramatic growth of international financial markets and an increasing reliance upon credit ratings (Cantor & Packer, 1994) .
The six major financial rating types and the focus of these ratings are shown below in A brief description of each of the six rating types is provided below:
Life Insurance Ratings
Life insurance ratings rank the solvency of life insurance companies, and for stakeholders, such as policy holders and life insurance agents, provide a convenient reference point for comparing insurers.
Credit Ratings
Credit ratings are the most popular type of rating and rank the probability of default for a corporate issuer of debt, such as a private sector organisation or a public sector agency. Credit rating agencies are an integral part of modern capital markets and their ratings are used as benchmarks by regulators, lenders and investors.
Mutual Fund Ratings
Mutual fund ratings rank the probability of excess investment performance of investment funds within the same asset class. For investors and their advisers, mutual fund ratings offer a way to monitor the performance of individual fund managers and asset classes within the growing managed investments market.
Sovereign Ratings
Sovereign ratings rank the probability of risk of default of a sovereign country's obligation to repay its foreign debt. These ratings also set the maximum credit rating achievable for state and municipal agencies within that country's jurisdiction.
Corporate Governance Ratings
Corporate governance ratings rank the probity of information and decisionmaking systems within listed and multinational corporations. These ratings provide an assessment of an organisations performance based on the effectiveness of its command and control systems.
Sustainability Ratings
Sustainability ratings rank organisations effectiveness at meeting the expectations of stakeholders while maintaining sustainable financial, environmental and social performance. These ratings provide an assessment of an organisation's ability to deliver a sustainable future.
Currently, the ratings provided by international agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, have become the default financial screening tools for rating risk and performance, and have become part of the essential lexicon of the corporate and investing community. Because achieving and maintaining a favourable rating for a corporation is so important, ratings are seen as a key influencer in corporate behaviour (Dillenburg, 2003) . For example, the chief executive of the recently restructured Australian insurance company AMP announced that before the company embarked on any major acquisition strategy, the company wanted to improve its standing with international rating agencies (Barnett, 2004, p. 28) . To achieve this improvement in standing, AMP plans to use surplus cash to pay down debt over the next 12 to 18 months. Lowering debt levels will affect its credit rating and AMP wants to achieve a minimum of an "A" credit rating at a group level and a "AA" rating at an AMP Life level. It is predicted that this will lower its cost of capital and improve its image for shareholders. Recently, part of AMP's corporate strategy was to achieve growth by acquisition. However, AMP is deferring the next step in rolling out its strategy until its debt levels are low enough to qualify for a higher credit rating and life rating (Barnett, 2004, p. 28) . Part of the rating criteria used in these rating types is to factor into the rating a score based on debt levels (source: www.standardandpoors.com). The higher the debt levels, the lower rating. In this example, the credit and insurance ratings are a key influencer in AMP's corporate behaviour (i.e. its decision to defer acquisitions and instead focus on debt reduction).
Organisations in the 21st century are surrounded by ratings. An insurance company manages its activities carefully to maintain or improve its A.M. Best rating, as that rating significantly impacts its ability to sell insurance products to the market. A corporation with debt is extremely interested in the Standard & Poor's or Moody's rating it receives, as that rating affects the company's cost of capital. An investment manager of a mutual fund company manages its investment products to obtain the highest Morningstar ratings possible, as it will capture increased market share of the investment fund flows (Dillenburg, Greene, & Erekson, 2003, p.172) . Achieving a favourable rating is extremely important to companies because, ultimately, the ratings effect what products they can buy or sell, in what markets and at what prices (Cantor & Packer, 1995) , which ultimately influences the profitability of the firm. All of these examples are of common rating schemes that measure financial ratings of companies and have an impact in influencing corporate behaviour.
SECTION 2: REVIEW OF RESEARCH RELATING TO RATING AGENCIES
The aim of this section is to explore the academic and other literature associated with the development and practices of rating agencies. This section will briefly review prior research relating to rating agencies and examine auditor independence frameworks.
Historically, the majority of studies on rating agencies have tended to focus on the rating type, and how rating agencies rate firms differently around the world (e.g. Ferri, Lui & Stiglitz, 1999; Monfort & Mulder, 2000; Cantor & Packer, 1994 .
Recently, new research has emerged that has looked at the influence ratings have on corporate behaviour. This area of research, and the literature explaining the contemporary trends in company disclosures, will now be examined. Dillenburg et al., (2003, p. 171) state that financial ratings can affect corporate behaviour to the extent that they are subject to ratings, over time, changing their management practices and their level and type of disclosure in an attempt to better satisfy the rating criteria.
Ratings, especially insurance and credit ratings such as solvency and risk, are extremely important to companies because ultimately the ratings affect what products they can buy or sell, in what markets and at what prices (Cantor & Packer, 1995) . For example, the credit rating that a company receives will determine, which trading partners it will deal with, the cost of its capital and ultimately the profitability and market value of the company. It should be no surprise that companies modify their behaviour to suit a higher score in these types of ratings.
Another factor that is affecting the behaviours of companies is the level of disclosure and transparency it makes to its stakeholders. This ultimately affects how the company is perceived in terms of economic and social metrics. Social metrics are how the stakeholders view the corporation's behaviour relative to acceptable standards regarding environmental, ethical and social performance. This is often referred to as sustainability. Also, there has been a considerable amount of research undertaken into the correlation between the financial performance of a company and its disclosure regarding its CSR practices and the transparency of its corporate governance. While the conclusions of this research remain contested between business and academia, there is a growing body of credible evidence to suggest that there is a link between increased financial performance and increased levels of CSR disclosure and transparency (Bauer et al., 2003 , Gompers et al., 2003 , Romona, et al., 1999 , Harrison & Freeman, 1999 With the changes in attitudes towards transparency and disclosure, especially from investors, and a greater appetite for socially responsible investing (Greene, 2003) , companies are becoming more interested in these social metrics. (Greene, 2003) .
In meeting this growing demand in SRI investment, new specialised products have been developed to track the performance of this new investment style. One of these is the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), which has consistently outperformed the Dow Jones Industrial World index (DJGI). For example, the total return on the index for the period December 1993 to February 2004 is 153% for DJSI and 108% for DGJI (source: www.sustainability-index.com). This is often cited as evidence that there is a link between increased financial performance of a firm and corporate social responsibility (Bauer et al, 2003; Brown & Caylor, 2004 , Grompers et al., 2003 Hamid & Sandford, 2002; Harrison & Freeman, 1999; Pava & Krausz, 1996; Roman et al., 1999; Waddock & Groves, 1997) .
Internationally companies are changing their behaviour and using disclosure and transparency as a strategy for gaining competitive advantage (Geld & Strawser, 2001; Fowler, 2002; Uren, 2003 , Wilson, 2004 . These companies are using their disclosure and reporting practices to differentiate their products and services, gain access to new markets, reduce their cost of capital, improve their stock prices and their financial performance.
This change in corporate behaviour and reporting practices has been bought about by new economic and social disclosure frameworks, which focus around the voluntary disclosure of information by a company (Geld & Strawser, 2001 Another area in the literature that has received some attention has been the area of independence and rating methodologies. Rating methodologies can be classified as either paid (solicited) or unpaid (unsolicited or co-operative). The issue of a payment to rating agency may: (1) create a conflict of interest between the rated company and the rater; and (2) provide a less accurate rating.
Because the rating agency receives a payment from the rated company when a solicited rating methodology is used, there exists the possibility of a conflict of interest. This conflict of interest can create an upward bias in the rating result, hence providing a less accurate rating (Cantor & Packer, 1997; Winnie, 2003) . This accuracy issue is not present in unsolicited or co-operative ratings.
Maintaining independence for a ratings agency is important as this will influence the acceptability of the rater's opinion in relation to a company's disclosures. Another area in the academic literature where the independence and acceptability of an opinion regarding company disclosures is vitally important is the area of audit independence.
The Importance of Auditor Independence
The auditing of financial statements is an essential part of the framework, which supports capital markets and other activities. The auditor's opinion adds value to the financial statement disclosures provided by a company through the independent verification it provides (Johnstone, Sutton & Warfield, 2001) . If the auditor is not seen to act independently of the company, then the audit opinion loses its value to the stakeholders. They argue that auditor independence is fundamental to public confidence in the audit process and the acceptability by stakeholders of auditors'
reports.
The collapse of Enron and the demise of Andersen have generally undermined confidence in the world's capital markets. Concern has focused on accounting and auditing practices, and particularly on the independence of auditors (Pound, Gay, Simnett, 2002) .
A significant and persistent criticism of auditors through the academic literature is that the provision by auditors of non-audit advisory services to companies undermines the independence of the audit. Four issues relating to the independence of the auditor have been identified (see, Antle, 1984; ICAEW, 2000; Shockley, 1981; Pringle & Bushman, 1996) . These four issues are: (1) the remuneration model of the audit firm;
(2) the level of non-audit advisory services provided by the auditor to the company; (3) the procedures for issuing and varying an audit opinion; and (4) the existence of conflicts of interest between the two parties These audit independence issues are managed through both ethical codes of conduct and legislation. In Australia, for example, the CLERP 9 audit reform proposals are a legislative move designed to improve auditor independence. These reforms include a disclosure by the company in the annual report of non-audit advisory income, and a mandatory statement issued by the audit committee stating that they are satisfied that the provision of non-audit advisory services is compatible with auditor independence.
There are several similarities between the roles of auditors and financial rating agencies. Both issue opinions based on company disclosures; both are fundamental to the operation of financial markets; both have the capacity to affect the behaviour of a company; and both need to maintain independence to ensure acceptability of their opinions. It is for these reasons that this paper will, in section 3, analyse the issues of independence in rating agencies from the framework of audit independence.
SECTION 3: INDEPENDENCE IN RATING AGENCIES
The aim of this section to develop a framework to understand the various rating agency methodologies. This is achieved by focusing on the issues affecting the independence of rating agencies using an audit independence framework. We also analyse the three rating methodologies 'solicited', 'unsolicited' and 'co-operative' and compares their independence and acceptability, and summarises the acceptability of the rating methodologies before concluding.
Maintaining independence for a rating agency is essential in protecting its credibility and ensuring that the objectivity of its judgment is not impaired because of its remuneration model, corporate relationships, conflicts of interest or ownership.
Because a rated company may pay a fee to the rater, this does not in itself create an actual conflict of interest, (i.e., a conflict that impairs the objectivity of the rater's judgment and is reflected in their rating). Rather, it is more appropriate to classify it as a potential conflict of interest, (i.e., something that should be disclosed and managed to ensure that it does not become an actual conflict).
The revenue model common among many rating agencies comes from two principal sources: (a) the sale of subscriptions to their research; and (b) fees paid by companies for the solicited ratings. This revenue model is analogous to members of the media that derive revenue from: (a) subscribers; and (b) advertisers that include companies covered in their publications.
Take for example the issue of independence and conflict of interest in a media company that derives revenue from its subscribers and advertisers that include companies they cover. For a media company, maintaining independent, unbiased coverage of the companies they cover is important to subscribers and the marketplace in general.
Making opinions about the acceptability of financial statement disclosures is the role of the auditor, and audit independence is an area that has revived attention in the academic literature. For this reason the audit independence framework will be used to identify issues of independence in rating agencies.
In determining if a ratings agency is independent of the company that it rates, four factors from the audit independence framework should be considered: (1) the remuneration model of the ratings agency; (2) the level of advisory services provided by the agency to the company; (3) the internal procedures of the ratings agency for issuing and varying a rating; and (4) the existence of conflicts of interest between the two parties. Each of these factors will be briefly described below:
Remuneration Model of the Rating Agency
Many independent rating agencies manage potential conflict through their remuneration policies. For example, the revenue received by a ratings agency from a company that is rated by their analyst is not a factor in that analyst's compensation. Instead, an analyst's compensation is a function of performance metrics, such as the quality and timeliness of research.
Level of Advisory Services Provided By The Agency To The Company
Rating agencies are seen as being independent where they do not have an advisory relationship with the companies they rate. This is similar to one of the principal requirements to protect the independence of auditor firms and their audit clients. This exclusion of an advisory relationship is a means by which the rating agency always maintains full independence and its revenue model is not based on the success of, or tied to, the level of the rating issued, and the level of fee charged to a company is not dependent on the ratings assigned.
Procedures for Issuing and Varying a Rating
Rating agencies maintain an independence from their clients where there are clear procedures for varying the rating where the circumstances of the rated company change. This ensures that the rating agency is at complete liberty to issue a different rating if circumstances change between, say, the issuance of the conditional rating and the final rating.
Existence of Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest can arise from the remuneration model used by the rating agency (Cantor & Packer, 1997; Winnie, 2003) , but they can also arise from the ownership structure. For example, the rating agency is owned or controlled by the company being rated. Rating agencies are seen as independent where there is no conflict of interest because of their ownership.
Next we will focus on the independence of rating agencies by using the framework developed in the audit independence literature to analyse their methodologies.
Rating issued by a rating agency can generally be classified as either a solicited, unsolicited or co-operative. This classification is used to distinguish the rating methodology upon three key attributes: (1) whether the company being rated has requested the rating; (2) whether the company being rated has paid the agency for the rating; and (3) whether the information source used by the rating agency relies on confidential and non-public information. The co-operative rating is a form of unsolicited rating where the rated organisation co-operates with the rating agency to provide additional sources of non-public information. This co-operation by the company to provide additional information helps to improve the reliability of the rating and therefore its acceptability to users.
Solicited ratings differ from unsolicited ratings in that the company seeking a rating requests the services of an agency to review its operations and issue a rating. An unrequested or unsolicited rating is where the rating agency issues a rating for a company, regardless of whether the company has requested the service or not. The cooperative rating is a form of unrequested or unsolicited rating. The compensation structure, hence agency framework, for unsolicited ratings differs markedly from solicited ratings in that the rating agency is not compensated by the firm for an unsolicited rating, whereas solicited ratings are almost entirely paid for by the rated organisation. As a co-operative rating is a form of unsolicited rating, the rating agency is not compensated for performing the rating service. The information source, hence rating methodologies, for unsolicited ratings differs markedly from solicited ratings in that an unsolicited rating is purely a statistical rating based on publicly available information published by the rated company (see Figure 1 below). With a cooperative rating, the rating agency relies on publicly available information as its primary source, plus supplementary information that may include surveys, interviews and other types of specifically requested non-public data. A comparison of the independence of rating methodologies is provided in Table 2 below: Comparing the three different rating methodologies, it can be concluded that under the solicited rating method the rating agency has: (1) a more reliable information source to form an opinion however, (2) it is unable to maintain its independence because of the existence of conflicts of interest, particularly in relation to the terms of its engagement and the payment it receives. These issues of independence are not typical under an unsolicited or co-operative rating methodology. Issues such as these will affect the acceptability of the rating method.
Solicited
The acceptability of the rating is ultimately the measure of it success, and this will be influenced by two key factors. The first issue affecting the acceptability of the rating methodology is maintaining independence and avoiding conflicts of interest. This issue has already been examined above section 3. The second issue that influences the acceptability of the rating methodology is the range of relevant information that is relied upon in forming the rating opinion.
Different rating methodologies rely on different information sources to determine the rating (see Table 3 below), and this source of information will ultimately determine the acceptability of the rating. Unsolicited ratings rely entirely on information in the public domain and, as such, the ability of the rating agency to issue an accurate rating is determined by the range of relevant information and the timeliness of the information that has been publicly disclosed by the company. Where a company does not disclose information into the public domain that is required by the rater's rating criteria, it is probable that any rating opinion that may be issued has not formed using all relevant information. This absence of information creates an acceptability issue for stakeholders relying on the rating. This acceptability issue is not present in solicited or co-operative ratings. A summary of the acceptability of the rating methodologies is shown in Table 3 below:
Solicited Unsolicited Co-operative affect the acceptability of the rating. The unsolicited and co-operative rating methods allow for independence to be maintained because independence is largely driven by agency remuneration. Ultimately, the most acceptable rating methodology is the cooperative rating method because of the greater reliability of the information source that is used in forming the rating opinion.
